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Abstract 
The problem of the richness of visual experience is that of finding principled grounds for 
claims about how much of the world a person actually sees at any given moment. It is argued 
that there are suggestive parallels between the two-component analysis of experience 
defended by Wilfrid Sellars, and certain recently advanced information processing accounts of 
visual perception. Sellars' later account of experience is examined in detail, and it is argued 
that there are good reasons in support of the claim that the sensory nonconceptual content of 
experience can vary independently of conceptual awareness. It is argued that the Sellarsian 
analysis is not undermined by recent work on change blindness and related phenomena; a 
model of visual experience developed by Ronald Rensink is shown to be in essential harmony 
with the framework provided by Sellars, and provides a satisfactory answer to the problem of 
the richness of visual experience.   
1. Introduction.   
How much does a person actually perceive at any given moment, in ordinary circumstances? 
Providing a satisfactory answer to this question is a fundamental problem in perception. The 
problem is especially acute when we consider the sense of sight.[1]   Normally, in looking at 
our surroundings, we tend to focus attention on a rather narrow selection of the objects in 
front of us. We become fully aware of only a little of all that is within our gaze. Yet at the same 
time we have a sense of being conscious of a wider field of view, a sense of an awareness of 
rich background detail involving items somehow present in experience, even when they are 
not the focus of attention. This is the problem of the richness of visual experience. This is a 
problem not only for philosophy, but also for cognitive psychology. The question is therefore, 
in what sense are we conscious of those objects that we do not properly attend to? This is the 
question I propose to explore in this paper, drawing upon both an important strand of the 
twentieth century philosophical tradition, and also current psychological theorising.   
One response to the problem suggests that the impression of rich background detail results 
from what is termed „a Grand Illusion‟. On this view, advocated by philosophers such as 
Daniel Dennett, and psychologists such as Susan Blackmore, it is not in fact true that 
experience has this rich character; we are somehow under an illusion about its true nature. 
The supposed richness of visual experience is a product of mistaken belief: there is no 
background detail.[2]     
A second type of response, advocated by O‟Regan and Noë, rejects Dennett‟s extreme 
position; they claim that the detail of the perceptual world is present in experience in the 
sense that we have access to it, an access involving practical knowledge – the possession of 
a range of sensorimotor skills – of how to bring its features into awareness.[3]   
Nevertheless, O‟Regan and Noë agree with Dennett on the point that my present visual 
consciousness does not consist in the concurrent representation of detail about the world 
around me. For O‟Regan and Noë, the richness of experience is not actual, but potential.   
A third response, one that agrees with the first two accounts in rejecting the idea of a 
separate sensory component in experience, accepts the position known as „intentionalism‟: on 
this view, perceptual experience is taken to be a unitary representational episode, a particular 
way of representing how things are.[4]   According to intentionalism, the phenomenal 
character of experience is, as Michael Tye expresses it, „one and the same as a certain sort 
of intentional content.‟[5]   The intentional, or representational, content of experience, on this 
alternative view, exhausts the character of experience.[6]   There are different versions of 
intentionalism, but what matters for this paper is that they all oppose the idea that conscious 
perceptual experience involves a number of distinct components or stages that may vary 
independently from each other. McDowell expresses the basic point in this way:   
„…we must not suppose that receptivity makes an even notionally separable 
contribution to its co-operation with spontaneity.[7]     
McDowell and Tye differ over the question of whether the representational content of 
experience is conceptual or nonconceptual; however, they do agree in claiming that there can 
be no difference in the phenomenal, or sensory character of experiences (the “receptivity”) 
that is not reflected in their representational contents. The richness of experience on this 
account is a feature of the representational content of experience, a content that may be 
indeterminate.   
In this paper I argue for a fourth approach to the problem of the richness of visual experience. 
It differs from all of the above mentioned positions. A version of this approach has been 
vigorously defended in a number of papers by Ned Block; the form that I shall elaborate has 
its roots in the two-component analysis of experience defended by Wilfrid Sellars throughout 
his career.[8]   Sellars‟ analysis of perceptual experience appeals to two quite distinct kinds 
of component: sensings, or sensory structures, which are thoroughly non-intentional, guide 
the exercise of low-level (or “proto-”) conceptual structures directed onto the external world. 
On Sellars‟ account, the phenomenological richness of our sensory representations is a real 
feature of experience, and is logically independent of any particular higher level classification 
and dispositions to act on the world.[9]   There are important parallels between Sellars‟ core 
ideas, and certain information processing models of vision advocated by theorists in the 
tradition of which David Marr was a prominent exponent. Such theories of visual perception 
can be seen as providing empirically based support for Sellars‟ central insight, namely that 
experience involves two radically different kinds of element which are causally related. One 
important and potentially fruitful model has been developed recently by Ronald Rensink.[10]   
His model offers a multi-stage analysis of visual representation. Selected elements of an 
inner, low-level, map-like representational array are taken up through focussed attention, 
resulting in a higher-level representation of a unified physical object.   
Rensink‟s work is informed by experimental work on attention and perception in cognitive 
psychology; the resulting theory therefore has many detailed features that go considerably 
beyond any conception of experience derivable from purely a priori theorising. Rensink‟s 
concerns are with the empirical validation of a theory of visual cognition; they are rather 
different from Sellars‟ overall project of providing a unified metaphysical account, one that 
aims at providing a synoptic view on how consciousness and physical matter are related.[11]   
Nevertheless, the two positions complement each other, and there are suggestive parallels. 
Most importantly for my purposes, is the idea common to both accounts that visual 
experience involves the formation of a first stage – a low-level, map-like array, or a sensory 
manifold – to which, in a second stage, the subject responds selectively by the employment of 
higher level representations.   
The central aim in this paper is to demonstrate that there are many good reasons for 
supporting the two-component view. In particular, the idea of an independent sensory 
component in experience makes sense of both the phenomenology of experience, and of the 
scientific findings about the underlying processes involved. This analysis of experience, 
defended on conceptual grounds by Sellars, and on the basis of experimental work by 
Rensink, offers a view that contrasts with that of the intentionalist.   
I shall not try to argue here against the intentionalist account of experience directly. According 
to Block, the debate between the two-component view and intentionalism is one of the most 
central in philosophy of mind, perhaps even in the whole of philosophy.[12]  The debate is 
complex, and cannot be decided in one paper alone. My aim is to show that the resonances 
between Sellars‟ analysis and Rensink‟s information-processing model should make us 
consider the two-component view very seriously as a means of approaching issues in 
perception. Adopting the two-component view provides a useful vantage point from which to 
examine questions about the nature of conscious awareness. It suggests a solution to the 
problem of the richness of visual experience.   
The argument of this paper runs as follows. I shall begin by arguing that there are good 
conceptual arguments in favour of the two-component analysis advocated by Sellars, 
especially as clarified in his later work: it should not be rejected on a priori grounds. I turn then 
to a consideration of the experimental work on attention considered by some critics to cause 
problems for the two-component view. I here concentrate in particular on showing that certain 
critical experiments on change and inattentional blindness can in fact be accommodated in a 
very satisfactory manner by the two-component view of experience. They do not undermine 
the account: it should not be rejected on a posteriori grounds. Thus my overall conclusion is 
that the two-component view provides a plausible account of what conscious experience is 
like.   
2. Background Assumptions.   
The debate between the two-component view and alternative conceptions of experience is 
largely independent of epistemological questions about the reliability of perceptual 
knowledge, and of the dispute between direct and indirect realist accounts of perception. 
Taking up one or other of the positions is often a prelude to arguments over these issues, but 
is not in itself decisive. Similarly, it is arguable that the debate is independent of ontological 
questions about the status of phenomenal qualities; while some interpret these along dualist 
lines, others, like Sellars, see them as compatible with forms of physicalism.[13]    
However, in order to get to grips with my main concern, about the extent of conscious 
perceptual experience, I need to clarify one key assumption I shall make. Through perception, 
we come into conscious contact with the physical world around us. We have experiences of 
that world. We can adopt different epistemic perspectives on experience. When we observe 
someone else seeing the objects in her environment, we can adopt an external, or 
third-person perspective on perception. Seeing has an objective character, in which a 
person‟s visual contact with the world is manifested principally in the way that, by seeing 
things, she is able to move around the environment and successfully engage with it. Seeing 
also has a subjective character: reflecting on my own case, I am aware that I see the world 
from a first-person perspective.[14]   This viewpoint involves two striking phenomenological 
features: in normal seeing my attention has a “directedness”, in virtue of which I am somehow 
aware of other objects, distinct from myself; and there is also the obvious fact that seeing 
involves vivid and richly detailed sensory (or phenomenal) experiences of the surrounding 
scene.[15]     
The fact that we have these two perspectives, however, cuts no ontological ice. It is arguable 
that there is an explanatory gap between a description of the subjective awareness I have of 
sensory states such as what it is like to have an experience of the colour red, and the 
objective description of what is involved in neurophysiological terms when I receive physical 
input from an objectively red object. But, as Joseph Levine has argued, this does not 
necessarily mean that we cannot identify the subjective state with a type of brain state or 
functional state.[16]   The conceptual gulf between the subjective and objective 
understanding shows little about the ontological status of the subjective states of mind. 
Independent considerations about the causal convergence of the roles of the states lend 
support to the view that they are very closely connected. In what follows I make no essential 
presuppositions about the ontological status of sensory, or phenomenal, qualities.   
I shall assume also that veridical, illusory and hallucinatory experiences can be similar from a 
subjective, phenomenological standpoint. Where the differences between them do not affect 
matters, I shall henceforth use the expression „perceptual experience‟ to apply generally to 
experiences of these general kinds. We now need to examine in detail the reasons for 
claiming that a version of the two-component structural analysis is true of them.   
3. Sellars’ Subtraction Argument: Sensory and Conceptual Components of Experience.   
Throughout his career, Sellars‟ writings on perception contain a line of thought that I shall 
label „the Subtraction Argument‟. In outline, the argument is simple, and has the following 
schematic form:   
1. Perceptual episodes such as seeing something (or merely seeming to see 
something) when considered as a whole, belong to the framework of representational 
states, and have propositional contents that can be expressed in the form:       „S 
sees that there is an F in front of her.‟   
2. For any such perceptual episode there is a matching pure propositional episode – a 
thought or belief - that has the same content, but involves no phenomenal aspect:       
„S thinks that there is an F in front of her.‟   
3. There is an essential difference between seeing (or merely seeming to see) 
something and thinking the same thing.   
4. This difference is accounted for by analysing perceptual episodes as involving, in 
addition, what Sellars calls the „descriptive content‟: a sensory, non-propositional 
component, that is, a sensory state (a sense-impression or “sensing‟‟). This 
component Sellars construes as a state of the perceiver.   
A succinct illustration of this argument occurs in "The Structure of Knowledge", where Sellars 
writes, „…there is all the difference in the world between seeing something to be a pink ice 
cube, and merely thinking something to be a pink ice cube.‟ He goes on to state, „over and 
above its propositional character….[perceptual] thinking has an additional character by virtue 
of which it is a seeing as contrasted with a mere thinking.‟[17]     
Sellars‟ conclusion is, like Kant‟s, that an important distinction should be drawn within visual 
experience. Experiences contain two components. Firstly, there is a sensory or phenomenal 
aspect of consciousness, a “brute reality” – some sort of entity that is actual, even if not 
necessarily physical. Experience, it is claimed, involves some scene made manifest in a 
unique and vivid way.[18]   As Valberg expresses the point, in experience, something is 
made present to the subject.[19]   The sensory aspect that is available in consciousness 
underpins and guides the higher cognitive processes, and enables successful demonstrative 
reference to be made. This component Sellars calls, variously, a sense impression, or a 
sensing. I shall refer to it as „the sensory state‟.   
Secondly, experience involves some employment of categories on the part of the subject, an 
intentional awareness of the kind of object to which the mind is directed. This intentional 
component involves, at a minimum, some sort of classification, the employment of low-level 
concepts (or proto-concepts). Such low-level concepts are to be understood, as Sellars spells 
out in his paper „Mental Events‟, as inner episodes that contribute to guiding complex 
behaviour; their employment may not support inferential connections of a sophisticated kind 
that the subject is able to rationally assess, but they share some important features with fully 
fledged concepts.[20]   In many respects Sellars' employment of the idea of such low-level 
concepts comes close to Peacocke‟s idea of “proto-propositional” content.[21]   
Underpinning this account is the following claim: for something – an animal, a human being – 
to constitute a representational system employing low-level concepts, the states of that 
system must be integrated in „a form of perceiving – inferring – wanting – acting organism‟. To 
ascribe a state with protopropositional content to the subject helps to explain its guided 
behaviour over time, in focussing upon an object, even if there are reasons for denying that 
such states are fully conceptual.   
The subtraction argument turns on the fact that there is an essential difference between, on 
the one hand, mere conceptual activity, even of a low-level form, and on the other, the richer 
conscious activity involved in perception.[22]   In what follows I shall therefore not be 
concerned with the distinction between low-level and fully fledged concepts, and for ease of 
exposition shall employ the term „concept‟ to cover both forms.   
4. The Third-Person Version of the Subtraction Argument.   
I shall argue that the Subtraction Argument is fundamentally sound. But there are several 
aspects of the argument that need to be examined before we can embrace its conclusion. 
Care needs to be taken here over exactly what Sellars means, and also over what is, and 
what is not essential to the argument‟s conclusion. In particular we need to clarify the precise 
nature of the last two steps in the Subtraction Argument, and the specific reasons Sellars has 
for interpreting perceptual episodes as being very different from mere thinkings.   
The central claim here is about the fact of a difference between ostensible seeings and mere 
thinkings, a difference that is independent of conceptual content. Although seeings and 
thinkings can share the same content, seeings must in some way involve a further component 
so as to account for this difference.   
Sellars consistently argues that we do not discover this component by a direct inspection of 
our own mental states. This fits with his criticisms of the Myth of the Given. However, he does 
not always make entirely clear the grounds for the key claim that there is a difference 
between seeing and thinking, and how this supports the account he wishes to uphold about 
the nature of the extra component . In places in „Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind‟ he 
simply asserts that there is a nonconceptual descriptive residue to seeing, which is left over 
when we subtract both the propositional content (i.e. the conceptual aspects), and also the 
extent to which the propositional claims in seeing are, or are not, endorsed.[23]     
When we carefully examine the exact reasons Sellars offers for asserting the difference, it 
transpires that Sellars appeals to two independent considerations in his various treatments of 
the Subtraction Argument. This is a point that is not always appreciated. I shall explore each 
version of the argument in turn.   
A first version of the argument figures prominently in the earlier writings, especially in Science 
and Metaphysics.[24]   According to this version, what motivates the introduction of sensory 
states is the existence of general conceptual differences between kinds of mental states. The 
concepts involved are available to third parties who, from an external perspective, witness the 
activity of another subject. The idea is that from this standpoint, we come to distinguish 
between certain representational states that occur in perception (that is, perceptual beliefs), 
and other kinds of representational state, such as pure belief. One such difference is that 
perceptual beliefs tend to arise in certain typical ways. Normally they occur in the presence of 
the objects they are about, and contribute in a direct way to actions, so that the subject is able 
to freely move around her environment. They tend also to be relatively independent of other 
beliefs. In order to explain the distinctive nature of perceptual beliefs, we should view them as 
connected with a further component, a distinct class of inner episodes that (in the normal 
case) causally mediate between them and physical input from the physical objects we see. 
These episodes are components of the overall experiences, and we can label them 
sense-impressions, or sensory states.[25]     
But it has to be conceded that this argument for a sensory nonconceptual component is very 
thin. It is essential to Sellars‟ conclusion that sensory states are considered as conscious 
states – as he subsequently makes quite explicit in the third Carus Lecture, „Is Consciousness 
Physical‟:   
Consciousness is a many splendoured thing, but as used in the title it refers to 
sensory consciousness, the sort of consciousness we have in virtue of feeling a pain 
or sensing a cube-of-ice-pinkly.[26]     
However, the problem on the third person version of the subtraction argument is that 
sense-impressions, introduced in terms of their causal-explanatory role in the manner 
described, need not be understood as conscious states. Third person objective 
characterizations will not get us to a grasp of subjective sensory consciousness.[27]   
McDowell rightly criticises this version of the subtraction argument in his Woodbridge lectures.   
He objects:   
…it is not clear why we should suppose that our explanatory need can be met only by 
finding a sameness at the level of visual sensations – items in consciousness – 
between the members of such a trio [of veridical, illusory and hallucinatory 
experiences], as opposed to sameness at the level of, say, patterns of light impinging 
on retinas.  
McDowell‟s conclusion is that nonconceptual sensations (that is, sensory states) „look like idle 
wheels‟.[28]     
The fundamental problem for what I am distinguishing as the first version of Sellars‟ 
Subtraction Argument is that third person, objective considerations are not going to deliver 
any conclusions about the nature of subjective consciousness. This reasoning is of a piece 
with the reasoning for the existence of an “Explanatory Gap”. There do not seem to be any 
straightforward entailments between descriptions of the physical and behavioural facts about 
a person, and descriptions of their conscious states. An objective description of what is going 
on in a person fails to capture the essential aspect of consciousness.[29]     
5. Perceptual Experience and Phenomenology.   
Nevertheless, there is more to the Sellars‟ argument for sense-impressions than we have so 
far uncovered. It is possible to reconstruct from Sellars‟ writings another, significantly different 
version of the Subtraction Argument. This second version is articulated more clearly in the 
later writings, but is already suggested in „Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind‟ when 
Sellars points out that the evidence for sense-impressions includes the fact that experiences 
are introspectible inner episodes: lookings that such and such is the case.[30]   The second 
version of the Subtraction Argument appeals to subjective, phenomenological considerations, 
and as such is not open to such criticisms directed at the first version.   
It is a familiar point that one central theme of „Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind‟ is the 
attack Sellars makes on what he characterises as „The Myth of the Given‟. It may therefore 
come as a surprise to some philosophers that Sellars should appeal in this way to subjective 
phenomenological considerations about the nature of experience. It will help to provide some 
chapter and verse.   
In his "The Structure of Knowledge" paper, referring to the „total experience‟ of seeing, Sellars 
claims:   
Now I think it is clear that, phenomenologically speaking, there is such a 
non-propositional component.[31]     
In the key later paper, „Some Reflections on Perceptual Consciousness‟, he argues that 
phenomenology has an important role to play in the analysis of experience, whilst also 
acknowledging its limitations:   
Sufficient to the occasion is an analysis of the sense in which we see of the pink ice 
cube its very pinkness. Here, I believe, sheer phenomenology or conceptual analysis 
takes us part of the way, but finally lets us down. How far does it take us? Only to the 
point of assuring us that something, somehow a cube of pink in physical space is 
present in the perception as other than as merely believed in.[32]     
In the Carus Lectures, he is more emphatic:   
The one thing we can say, with phenomenological assurance, is that whatever its 
“true” categorial status, the expanse of red involved in an ostensible seeing of the 
redness of an apple has actual existence as contrasted with the intentional 
in-existence of that which is believed in as believed in.[33]     
Sellars admits at the start of the Carus Lectures that in his earlier writings on the Myth of the 
Given, „Some formulations were at the very least misleading, and, in general, the scope of the 
concept of the Given was ill-defined.‟ Nevertheless, he claims that his afterthoughts 
„…invariably turned out to be variations on the original theme.‟[34]   To reject the appeal to 
phenomenology as inconsistent with his earlier criticisms is to misunderstand the whole thrust 
of Sellars‟ attack on the Given.   
The Myth of the Given chiefly concerns a number of false conceptions about the relation 
between sensory nonconceptual experience and our beliefs about the things we are aware of. 
In its most basic form, the Myth involves the idea that when a subject has a sensory state of 
kind F, this entails that the subject thereby entertains the concept applicable to that kind 
F.[35]   So at root, what Sellars opposes is the view that there is some kind of logical or 
quasi-logical connection between sensory and conceptual states.   
This confusion about the relationship between the sensory and the conceptual is what 
underlies the various conceptions of the Given that Sellars criticises throughout „Empiricism 
and the Philosophy of Mind‟. At one extreme, it is manifested in the „mongrel idea‟ that Sellars 
criticises in Part 1. This is a view that directly conflates the sensory and the conceptual 
components of experience. Thus, “being aware of something red” is treated as a unitary 
episode, an episode that is both a kind of sensation, yet also a form of knowing. For Sellars, 
as for Kant and Wittgenstein, the sensory and the conceptual differ fundamentally, and cannot 
be equated in this way.[36]   A sensory state is an occurrent state of consciousness, 
whereas a conceptual episode is essentially dispositional, and also has distinctive normative 
aspects.[37]     
But the confusion about the relation between the sensory and the conceptual can also arise in 
other ways, for example, if it were claimed that perceptual beliefs are inferred directly from 
sensory states. According to Sellars, since the sensory and the conceptual belong to quite 
different orders, there can be no such logical relation of entailment between them. Most 
importantly, we cannot appeal to the idea of “direct inspection” of sensory experience in order 
to justify a belief about it. Nor does it make sense to claim that we somehow examine the 
nature of raw sensory experience by a process of “perceptual reduction”, and then acquire 
concepts directly through some sort of process of abstraction.[38]     
It is necessary therefore to distinguish between three questions:   
1. Is there a distinct conscious sensory nonconceptual component in experience? 2. Is 
it possible to discover such a sensory component, independent of the employment of 
concepts, by some kind of direct confrontation with experience – by some kind of 
direct inspection and abstraction, or attentive perceptual reduction? 3. Can some of 
the results of phenomenology – understood in a broad sense as a way of exploring the 
totality of what is present in conscious experience – be used as indirect evidence for 
distinctions in consciousness, and thus of the fact that experience contains 
nonconceptual sensory states?  
It is incontrovertible that on Sellars‟ view, experience does contain a conscious, 
nonconceptual, sensory component. The answer to the first question has to be in the 
affirmative. Sellars does not object to the notion of sensory experience as such but, as 
deVries and Triplett point out, „rather to the idea that we can simply find such a thing by 
attentive examination of our experiences.‟[39]     
6. The First-Person Version of the Subtraction Argument.   
If having a purely nonconceptual sensory state, such as a red shape, is considered as one 
component in experience, then it cannot, on its own, directly provide a route to a conceptual 
grasp of its nature. Our understanding of the claim that there is a sensory component in 
experience cannot be supported by an appeal to direct inspection.[40]   The question 
therefore arises as to how we do arrive at any sort of understanding of the general nature of 
sensory experience, if this is not obtained by direct examination. How it is that having 
first-person experience is at all relevant to an understanding of the concepts we apply to 
experiences? How, for example, is the fact that a sighted person has experiences of colours 
connected with her ability to understand fully what it is see something red? We need to find a 
way of doing justice to the common-sense fact that a person cannot acquire the full concept 
of experiential colour without being able to have colour experiences.   
Fortunately, there is another means by which we can defend the idea of conscious 
nonconceptual sensory states, and explain how we attach a sense to claims about them. 
Sellars argues that we may have indirect phenomenological reasons for thinking that not all 
the properties that arise in experience are involved in the same way. There are indeed two 
components in experience, but we do not arrive at an understanding of this fact by direct 
inspection. There is a big difference between phenomenology, understood in a broad sense 
as dealing with the entirety of our perceptual consciousness, and the idea of direct inspection 
of nonconceptual sensory states. A failure to understand this difference can lead to a 
confusion about what Sellars is up to in his later work.   
In broad terms, phenomenology deals with those features of perceptual consciousness that 
the subject is aware of from her own subjective standpoint. Phenomenology, in this sense, 
appeals to the entirety of our perceptual experience, and does not restrict itself to a narrow 
focus on the purely sensory aspects of experience.[41]   If we consider the nature of 
perceptual experience from a phenomenological standpoint, this provides us with a 
first-person version of the Subtraction argument that avoids the difficulties that attach to the 
approaches considered above.   
The most obvious fact about experiences, considered subjectively, is that they differ from 
purely conceptual states such as belief. Visual and other experiences manifest the presence 
of qualities, in a manner that is quite different from the way that qualities are represented in 
pure thought. Phenomenologically, there is all the difference in the world, as Sellars notes, 
„between seeing something to be a pink ice-cube and merely thinking something to be a pink 
ice-cube.‟ No amount of philosophising can argue away the brute difference between the way 
properties such as the shape or colour of an object are actually present in experience, and 
the way such properties occur when merely thought of, when they have only intentional 
in-existence. The fact of the difference between perceptual experience and thinking is 
therefore established by reflecting on the nature of first-person conscious states. Once this 
phenomenological point is established, it can then be combined with the conceptual 
consideration that beliefs and visual experiences (understood in the broad sense) are in 
important respects similar: they can share exactly the same conceptual contents. Just as I 
can think that there is something red and triangular (in front of me, etc.), or think that there is 
a book on the table, or think that Gandini is juggling five clubs, I can see that there is 
something red and triangular (in front of me, etc.), or see that there is a book on the table, or 
see that Gandini is juggling five clubs.   
But then it follows from these considerations that a first-person version of the Subtraction 
Argument is vindicated. If I compare what it is like to have the total – conceptualised – 
experience of seeing a red and triangular shape with merely thinking about a red and 
triangular shape, I am aware not only of a similarity in the propositional content, but also of 
some further difference between the two states. The experience must have a further sensory 
nonconceptual aspect that accounts for the difference between them: the red triangular shape 
is present in my consciousness as a visual expanse in a manner that is very different from a 
thought about a red triangle.[42]   The argument generalises: If, for any perceptual 
experience with a given conceptual content p, there can be a corresponding thought with the 
same content, then the conceptual content cannot exhaust the experience state. So we have 
indirect grounds for claiming that experience involves a component that is not conceptual, but 
sensory.   
No claim is made here that we arrive at this claim through a process of perceptual reduction, 
finding out about our sensory nonconceptual states by some kind of direct inspection. Rather, 
we arrive at the conclusion that there is a nonconceptual aspect indirectly, by reflecting on the 
general differences and similarities pertaining to experience and belief. In doing so we appeal 
to the kinds of self-ascription that we find ourselves employing in common-sense usage.   
Perhaps because McDowell is concerned with Sellars‟ claim that hallucinatory and veridical 
experiences have a common content, and with explicating Sellars‟ ideas about intentionality, 
he appears to overlook the fundamental question that Sellars is concerned with in „Empiricism 
and the Philosophy of Mind‟, which is that of providing a proper account of the sensory 
dimension to experience. He dismisses Sellars‟ claim that there is a sensory element in 
consciousness that is „outside the space of reasons‟, as he expresses it. McDowell assumes 
that perceptual experiences are fully accounted for in conceptual terms, and are therefore 
completely enclosed in the space of reasons. He thus overlooks the force of the first-person 
version of the subtraction argument. However, on McDowell‟s own account, it is left unclear 
how seeings are to be distinguished from mere thinkings. Both are classified for McDowell as 
conceptual episodes. But we are still owed an account of what distinguishes them.   
For McDowell, there seem to be two ways in which experiences and thoughts differ. Firstly, 
he claims that experiences are „shapings of visual consciousness‟ (p.442), and „conceptual 
episodes of a special kind, already conceived as conceptual shapings of sensory, and in 
particular, visual consciousness.‟‟.[43]   But to describe matters in this way is not to explain 
the difference, but merely to label it as such. No clue is provided as to how they differ. 
Perhaps the second way in which McDowell refers to the difference is supposed to provide 
the explanation. He claims that visual experiences are evoked „by an ostensibly seen object‟. 
But this begs the question. What is “ostensibly seeing”? How does it differ from merely 
thinking? Obviously there is a causal, external difference in the way that the states arise. 
However, this does not help us to understand what constitutes the essential difference 
between seeing and thinking that is manifest from the first-person point of view . It cannot 
ground the subjective difference in consciousness. This follows for the same reason that the 
third-person version of the subtraction argument fails; external considerations bring us no 
nearer to understanding subjective differences. Thus again we are left with a claim that 
experiences and thinkings differ subjectively, but no grasp of the ground of the difference. 
McDowell‟s attempts to capture the essential distinguishing feature of experience leave us 
none the wiser. Sellars‟ two-component analysis of experience, on the other hand, offers 
prospects of accounting for its distinctive nature.   
This way of understanding the Subtraction Argument provides an answer to questions about 
the nature of our understanding of sensory nonconceptual experience – the central problem 
that Sellars is concerned with in „Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind‟. On Sellars‟ account 
we have an explanation of what it is that we understand when we say of another person that 
she is having a sensory experience of something red, or when we apply the concept of a red 
experience in our own case. There is a sensory state that is additional to any thoughts we 
entertain. Such an understanding is what we appeal to when we make certain claims about 
appearances, for example, when describing an experience known to be hallucinatory: „I know 
that there is no red physical object in front of me, but nevertheless there is something red and 
triangular involved in my experience.‟   
7. The Nature of Sensory States.   
Claims about sensory states have a sense for us because they are understood as both 
evidentially and conceptually connected with their input and output. The conceptual 
connections that contribute to our grasp of the nature of sensory states are twofold. The first 
kind of connection is straightforwardly with the type of physical object that normally causes 
the type of sensory state in question. A sensory experience of red, for example, is in part 
characterised by reference to objective matters, as the kind of state that arises given input 
from red physical objects in normal circumstance, etc. A second kind of connection is with our 
perceptual beliefs about the environment. Typically, the sensory experience of red received 
from looking at a red object in normal circumstances leads us to form beliefs, not about our 
own states of mind, but directly about the objects in our surroundings; such beliefs may lead 
on to action.   
The connections with physical input, and the final behavioural output that perceptual beliefs 
can give rise to are what enable us, in practice, to communicate about our sensory states. We 
inherit a capacity to report directly upon our nonconceptual experiences, and by social 
training are inculcated into the practice of so doing.[44]   It is not the outcome of a process of 
abstraction, predicated on an incoherent notion of The Given. This ability to report directly on 
the nature of our sensory states is worth examining in more detail.   
Strawson argues that experience is thoroughly permeated with the concepts of the objects 
which figure in perceptual judgements. His claim is that we cannot give a veridical description 
of an experience without reference to the conceptual contents of the perceptual judgement it 
involves. The perceptual judgement is „internal to the characterization of the experience‟ in 
virtue of which I come to make that judgement.[45]   The suggestion is that the concepts we 
apply in our normal perceptual judgments about the world exhaust the characterization of 
their contents; there are no independent sensory states that we can report upon. But here, as 
so often in the philosophy of mind, the “internal connection” is at most a connection that holds 
between types of experience and types of judgement. The general idea of the sensory 
nonconceptual component of experiences is indeed conceptually connected with an 
acceptance of the broadly common-sense, realistic conception of the objective physical world, 
as Strawson asserts. But this is quite compatible with the idea that the nonconceptual 
component of experience has, in any given token experience, a degree of autonomy, and is 
not fully identified by the contents of the specific perceptual belief about the world that I have 
on that occasion. It is indeed true that I often characterise the experience as a whole in terms 
that mirror the way I would express the perceptual judgement involved. But as noted, we may 
also have reasons for focussing more narrowly on the nonconceptual component. To draw 
attention to this other aspect is not to deny Strawson‟s claim that perceptual experience 
presents itself as „an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us‟. It is to 
assert that fact that this consciousness has a sensory character that belief alone lacks.   
Moreover, there are good reasons for holding that most normal perceptual experience has a 
rich complexity that far outruns the content of the perceptual judgements they involve. I can 
reflect on the fact that my perceptual experience contains, as Brian O‟Shaughnessy notes, a 
mass of „teeming detail‟. I do not, and cannot attend to every aspect of it. The point is that 
there is usually too much that is present in my experience in a single moment for me to attend 
to and conceptualise every aspect. The concepts that naturally spring to mind when I 
contemplate my surroundings in no way exhaust what is present in a nonconceptual way. 
This point about the richness of experience, it should be noted, is separate from the question 
of the fineness of grain of sensory experience, a feature that has also been cited as 
distinguishing sensory and conceptual content.   
Because of the two-fold nature of the conceptual connections with the sensory component, 
we can make sense of the idea that, when I look at a Persian carpet, the sensory component 
of my visual experience is not completely identified by my perceptual thoughts – it can also be 
identified by reference to the physical input that leads to it. Unless I am an expert, different 
but similarly patterned carpets can lead to identical judgements about them.[46]   But 
because the physical input from the two carpets differs, there are grounds for claiming that 
the sensory components of the two experiences are different in kind. This is not to say that I 
implicitly notice, in a conceptual sense, the character of my nonconceptual experience. 
Strawson rightly criticises Ayer on this point. The claim is, rather, that much of the detail of the 
carpet is captured in my nonconceptual sensory state, even though I may not conceptualise 
all that is present in this way in my experience.[47]     
Thus I may say of another perceiver that she must be having an experience of a certain visual 
kind – meaning that her experience contains a certain type of sensory nonconceptual 
component – on the grounds that she is facing a certain scene, and with her eyes open. My 
grounds for asserting this claim about her visual experience is based upon physical criteria, 
together with certain implicit background assumptions to the effect that she has normal 
eyesight, is not suffering the effects of some drug that impairs her vision, and so on. Such 
physical criteria may occasionally come into conflict with what may be termed the belief 
criteria – the subject‟s own beliefs, as expressed in her reports, about what she sees. So 
suppose the subject says she cannot see any turquoise colour in the carpet in front of her. I 
may claim that although she fails to notice it, there is in fact an area with that colour almost 
directly in front of her, and that it is present in her experience. My attribution of a certain 
feature in her sensory experience may then be vindicated, when after a brief further moment 
she does notice the turquoise area.[48]     
It is true that such physical criteria for claims about sensory states are defeasible. The 
background assumptions implicitly relied upon are testable. I may wrongly claim of someone 
that she has a nonconceptual experience of two different shades of colour, because I am 
unaware of the fact that she is color blind. In other words, a physical condition affecting input 
prevents her having a certain kind of sensory nonconceptual experience. But such cases will 
manifest themselves by the general way in which the subject fails to discriminate physical 
inputs across a whole range of cases.   
The evidential links with physical input and fully conceptualised perceptual experiences fix the 
reference of our sensory vocabulary. By providing us with a way of thinking about the sensory 
component of experience, they allow us to attach a general sense to sensory concepts.[49]   
This view allows the possibility that our understanding of the nature of sensory states can be 
extended. The intrinsic properties of sensory states can be further characterised in terms of 
properties that are understood by analogy as closely mapping the resemblances and 
differences between physical objects.[50]   So the way is open, as we shall see in the next 
section, for a fuller understanding of visual sensory states as inner map-like states with 
properties that are analogous to the spatial aspects of physical objects. As we have seen, it 
also makes sense to claim that there is more to the nature of visual sensory states than we 
can be aware of at any particular moment. Sensory content outruns our attentional capacities. 
There is more going on in my overall experience than I am conceptually aware of.   
8. Inattentional Blindness and Connected Empirical Objections.   
According to the two-component account of perceptual experience we have been considering, 
there are aspects of the perceiver‟s sensory experience present in her consciousness that 
she may not be attending to. The claim is that these features are exist, even if the subject 
does not realise it. I have argued that this claim is not defeated by a priori argument; is this 
view consistent with empirical work on vision? Certain recent experiments on the limitations of 
visual attention have been interpreted by some philosophers and cognitive scientists to 
undermine the account offered here.   
A cluster of experiments on “Change Blindness”, “Inattentional Blindness” and associated 
phenomena have produced surprising results. According to one plausible characterization, 
these results show that we consciously take in far less of the visual world than it seems to us 
that we are aware of. It is worth briefly summarising the results of two recent sets of 
experiments, in order to give a flavour of this work. Simons and Chabris describe a striking 
example of Inattentional Blindness.[51]   Subjects were asked to perform a task that involved 
watching a video of a casual basketball game that lasts for about a minute. The task involves 
counting the number of consecutive passes between members of one of the teams. While the 
basketball is being thrown from player to player, something unexpected takes place: a person 
dressed in a black gorilla-suit walks through the play, stops briefly in the centre of the picture, 
thumps his chest, and then walks off. Although most subjects correctly record the number of 
passes made by the team, at least half of these subjects fail to notice the gorilla-suited 
interloper, who is visible for about nine seconds. When shown the video sequence a second 
time they are amazed to observe what they had previously overlooked.[52]     
In Change Blindness experiments, a subject is asked to attend to a picture of a scene, for 
example of two people in the foreground, with a number of buildings clearly visible in the 
background. A brief flicker, or transient, interrupts the display, which then returns with one 
substantial change – a large building in the background is no longer visible. This display 
remains visible for a few seconds, and then again the flicker occurs and the switch is made, 
returning to the original picture. It may take many such alternations between images before 
the subject finally notices the large scene change not previously attended to; again, this 
produces surprise on the part of the subjects, when they realise they have overlooked an 
apparently obvious change. What is agreed by all theorists is that the phenomena of Change 
and Inattentional Blindness, etc, are well established. These experiments provide strong 
evidence about the limits of attention. What is less clear is exactly what they show about the 
overall nature of visual experience.   
One straightforward reaction to the experimental work is to interpret it as showing something 
about the limitations of our concept forming processes and memory, rather than about the 
limitations of experience. The idea in the more simple-minded versions of this response is that 
a subject does indeed take in and process information relating to most of the scene in front of 
her, but then rapidly forgets the details that are not connected with her plans and projects. So 
formulated, this “instant forgetting” response offers an implausible account of why unusual 
features of scenes are overlooked, as Andy Clark notes.[53]     
However, there are more subtle variants of the idea, as we shall see in due course. In order to 
properly assess these, it is first useful to appreciate why the alternative responses canvassed 
are not satisfactory.   
As it turns out, there is strong empirical evidence for the claim that information from items in 
view is at least physically registered by the subject, even when she is unable to report them 
directly. This evidence is of two kinds. First, there is considerable evidence that unattended 
features of displays have priming effects. Mack and Rock give a number of examples of this 
in their work on inattentional blindness. In one experiment cited, a group of subjects failed to 
notice the written word „flake‟ when being asked to attend to a distracting task. A significantly 
higher than average percentage of these subjects subsequently chose a picture of a 
snow-flake from a display of five different objects. Mack and Rock claim that this experiment 
„seems to provide clear evidence of semantic priming, because a stimulus that was not 
consciously perceived seems to have a determining influence on the choice of the picture 
made by a significant number of subjects‟. They conclude that there is „clear evidence of the 
implicit perception of stimuli to which subjects are inattentionally blind.‟[54]   A second 
source of evidence consists in the very common-place fact that attention can be attracted by 
changes in the scene that are unmasked – movements on the periphery of the visual field will 
cause eye saccades and attract attention. Some event is registered as taking place, before 
we attend to and classify it.   
It may still be claimed that these cases do not show anything about conscious experience, 
even if they do show, pretty well conclusively, that at some level the subject is registering 
much of the data in the surroundings. But there is further evidence that shows that data from 
the unattended parts of the visual field enter into conscious experience. In the experiments on 
inattentional blindness attention is highly focussed, and background phenomena are ignored. 
But in other, more normal, contexts, subjects are able very rapidly to ascertain the gist or 
„general sense of a complete scene‟. So a subject becomes able, in a very short space of 
time – in the order of 120 milliseconds – to report on the overall type of scene she sees: 
whether the scene shown is, for example, a party, a garden, a harbour, and so on. In addition, 
subjects are also able to report rapidly upon the overall layout of a scene, even when they 
cannot report much of the detail it contains. We can absorb the information from events in the 
environment for certain purposes rather more quickly than seems to be required for detailed 
conceptual awareness of specific aspects of the scene.[55]     
These objectively verifiable abilities support the idea that conscious experience does indeed 
contain a considerable amount of structure that is conceptualised only at a general level. Note 
that this means that, in a sense, the structure of the background sensory experience is still 
attended to; the attention is, however, largely unfocussed, so that specific objects are not 
conceptualised as such. The point is that the concepts employed do not relate to all the 
detailed features present in sensory experience; the concepts do not reflect any separateness 
in the objects experienced. But the concepts employed do relate to different overall kinds of 
scene that, necessarily, differ from each other in “gist” only because the experiences of the 
scenes contain differences at a more detailed level. We may speculate that our subjective 
experience of a rich and detailed background, situated around the central foveated area to 
which we normally attend in seeing, is intimately connected with the low-level stages of vision 
that are a central feature of information processing accounts of vision.   
One important theory of attention in harmony with Sellars‟ two-component conception of 
sensory experience is the model recently developed by Ronald Rensink, building on the basic 
framework set out by David Marr. Rensink argues there is considerable evidence for the 
formation of a „low-level map-like representation‟ at an early stage of visual processing. On 
Rensink‟s account, the low-level map like representation is not a stable structure, but is 
extremely volatile, being constantly updated: it is „largely created anew after each eye 
movement‟.[56]   Representations at the lower level are categorised only by their spatial 
features and location. They play a crucial explanatory role in accounting for changes in 
fixation and attention, in priming, and in our knowledge of the overall layout, and of the gist of 
scenes. It is only at higher levels of processing, where focussed attention is brought into play, 
that a „coherence field‟ generates the specific representations (involving higher-level 
conceptual categories) of individuated physical objects in the environment. At this level we 
come to grasp and form beliefs about the stable world of objects in our surroundings.   
It is plausible to claim that Sellars‟ two-component view of experience is consonant with the 
kind of information processing account of seeing defended by Rensink and others. On 
Rensink‟s, and similar models of attention, there are two key stages in the overall take up of 
information that contributes to higher level decision making based upon beliefs about the 
objective nature of the surroundings. Initial unconscious processing leads to a low-level stage 
at which the map-like array is formed. This is an essentially spatial structure of 
“proto-objects”, that is, „relatively complex assemblies of fragments that correspond to 
localised structures in the world‟.[57]   Such proto-objects provide the raw material on which 
the attentional processes act. This leads on to the second stage. In attending to some part of 
this spatial array, we conceptualise aspects of the scene as forming a coherent unity across 
time, as an object of some kind. These two stages correspond to the sensory and the 
conceptual components of conscious experience. It is arguable that sensory experience 
supervenes, at least in part, upon the low-level map-like array postulated on Rensink‟s 
account.   
We can build upon this model of experience to provide a variant of the “rapid forgetting” 
response to the experimental evidence for Change Blindness, etc. Andy Clark‟s criticisms of 
this response are worth quoting more fully. He writes:   
Some element of forgetting may, I accept, be involved in some of these cases. But 
overall, the hypothesis strikes me as unconvincing. First of all, it is not really clear 
whether „seeing-with-immediate-forgetting‟ is really any different from not seeing at all. 
(Recall Dennett‟s 1991 discussion of Stalinesque versus Orwellian accounts). Second, 
we know that only a very small window of the visual field can afford high resolution 
input (Ballard 1991), and we know that attentional mechanisms probably limit our 
capacity to about 44 bits (plus or minus 15) per-glimpse (see Verghese and Pelli 
(1992), Churchland et al (1994). So how does all that fleeting richness get 
transduced? And lastly, as Simons (2000) nicely points out, the inattentional amnesia 
account seems especially improbable when the stimulus was an opaque gorilla 
presented for up to 9 seconds. Could we really have been consciously aware of that 
and then had it slip our minds?[58]     
The two-component model of experience allows satisfactory reply to be made to Clark‟s 
objections. The main thrust of this reply is that, on a model of experience such as Rensink‟s, 
although the sensory information from the whole scene in front of the observer is initially 
processed to a rudimentary level, little of it is categorised at a higher conceptual level, hence 
little of it is available for storage in the memory system. The key insight is that detailed 
information about specific events in the scene is not forgotten, because most of it is never 
conceptualised by the subject in the first place. A full higher-level representation of the scene, 
complete with a classification of its all elements, is never constructed. Nevertheless, low-level 
information about the objects that are before the subject is represented in a volatile map-like 
spatial array, a visual field that is constantly regenerated.   
Clark‟s objections can be responded to in more detail. First, there is no 
“seeing-with-immediate-forgetting”; the subjects who fail to report the gorilla suited figure 
never conceptualised input from the figure as forming a unified coherent object. The input 
does indeed contribute to the map-like array so that the subjects were aware that they were 
seeing, and not just thinking. The input from the gorilla suit may be processed in terms of a 
low-level array of shapes and colours. Crucially, however, the input leading to the formation of 
the map-like array is not classified at any higher level. Being processed no further, a 
representation of a gorilla does not even reach the subject‟s short term memory. If you do not 
come to believe, and store, information in the first place, you cannot be said to forget it. This 
reflects an important and necessary feature of any information processing system, that detail 
must be sacrificed to allow complex higher level classification at a subsequent stage. Second, 
it is not denied that only the central foveated area of the visual field affords high resolution 
input; so we may admit that the surrounding areas in the low-level spatial array do not contain 
structures articulated in great detail, though they do contain a certain amount of structure. 
Third, only a fraction of that structure in the low-level array feeds into the attentional 
mechanisms; limitations on the capacity of those mechanisms do not affect the amount that is 
processed earlier on in the perceptual system.[59]     
9. Conclusion.   
In conclusion, none of the experimental work on Change Blindness, Inattentional Blindness 
and related syndromes undermines the claim that visual experience involves the presence of 
sensory features that are not fully attended to, and whose complexity may out run the 
capacity we have to conceptualise our surroundings at a higher level in terms of the kinds of 
distinct physical object present. There is considerable experimental evidence that supports 
the view that visual experience contains a stage at which there are low-level spatial 
representations that contribute to explaining how the attentional system functions. Such 
representations may contribute to the subjective phenomenology of vision; in other words, 
they may be identified with conscious sensory states.   
Sensory states, as I have argued, are to be distinguished from the conceptual and intentional 
realm. They have the general characteristics of phenomenal presence, determinateness (up 
to the limits of visual acuity), and actual existence; in themselves they lack any kind of low- or 
high-conceptual element, and they do not refer in the way that intentional states do. In 
contrast, many of the sorts of states often described in recent literature as nonconceptual 
share important characteristics with fully fledged conceptual states and processes: they 
involve classificatory activity, and may involve an intentional aspect.   
At the outset of this paper, I quoted McDowell‟s claims about the alleged tight logical 
dependence of the sensory aspect of experience on the conceptual. Contrary to such 
intentionalist claims, there are detailed features of the sensory component of experience (= 
receptivity) that outrun the concepts we employ at the time (= spontaneity). On both a priori 
and posteriori grounds, it can be argued that the sensory component involves aspects that 
vary independently from the intentional/conceptual components of experience. There is, I 
have argued, a striking and productive synergy between Sellars‟ two-component analysis of 
experience, and information processing accounts exemplified in the experimentally based 
theory put forward by Rensink. This points to a way of understanding perceptual experience 
that allows a certain autonomy to the low-level sensory component. In perception, a rich and 
detailed sensory state may be present as one component of conscious experience, even if 
the subject does not conceptually grasp every aspect of that state. The presence of such rich 
and detailed sensory states in consciousness accounts for the impression that there is more 
in perceptual experience than we can attend to at any given moment. It also makes sense of 
the fact that experiences of the same scene can be conceptualised in different ways.   
If this two-component model is on the right lines, we must reject the intentionalist account of 
experience. The problem of the richness of visual experience is resolved. We can agree with 
the common-sense intuition that there is more in experience than we are explicitly aware of at 
any given moment.   
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Notes  
1. I shall concentrate in this paper on vision.  
2. See for example D. Dennett (1991) and (2002); Susan Blackmore (2002).  
3. K. O‟Regan and A. Noë (2001); A. Noë (2002).  
4. The label is used by Alex Byrne in his defence of the position (2001).   
5. M. Tye (1995), p.137.  
6. On Tye‟s account, the representational and intentional contents of experience are equated: 
see for example Tye (1995) ch. 4. I believe that this equation is mistaken: the sensory, 
representational and intentional contents of experience all differ. I do not argue the point 
explicitly here, though reasons for taking this different view are hinted at in the text.  
7. J. McDowell (1994/96), p.51.  
8. For examples, see N. Block (1990) and Forthcoming; and W. Sellars (1956), (1975), 1977) 
and (1981a).  
9. The precise nature of the sensory component of experience is not made entirely clear in 
Sellars‟ earlier work such as the seminal (1956), but is clarified in later writings such (1977) 
and (1981a).  
10. R. Rensink (2000a) and (2000b).   
11. These aims are spelled in his (1963b) and (1981a).  
12. Ned Block (Forthcoming).  
13. As Sellars spells out in his (1982a) Lecture II, part VII.  
14. The distinction is defended by, amongst others, T. Nagel (1986).  
15. I shall use the terms „sensory‟ and „phenomenal‟ interchangeably.  
16. J. Levine (2001); see also the arguments in N. Block and R. Stalnaker (1999).  
17. W. Sellars (1975), p.306-7.  
18. As S. Sturgeon expresses the point (2000) p. 9.  
19. J. Valberg, (1993), p.4-5.  
20. W. Sellars (1981b).  
21. Peacocke (1992) chapter 3. Many other modern theorists have made a distinction 
between conceptual and nonconceptual content that broadly corresponds to the distinction 
Sellars makes between low-level, primitive concepts, and higher-level concepts that involve 
some kind of a self-awareness on the part of the subject; see, for example, J. Bermudez 
(1998).  
22. See for example Sellars‟ remarks at the start of the third Carus Lecture (1981a).  
23. For example in (1956) sections 16 and 22.  
24. W. Sellars (1968).  
25. W. Sellars (1956), section 60.  
26. W. Sellars (1982), Lecture III, sections 2 – 5 and passim.  
27. There is a complication caused by the fact that Sellars tends to conflate the third-person 
version of the subtraction argument with the thesis that there is a common content to 
veridical, illusory and hallucinatory experiences. For reasons I have argued elsewhere (1998), 
I believe that Sellars is entitled to this later claim. Since the point is tangential to the 
sensory/conceptual distinction, however, I shall not pursue this dimension of Sellars‟ 
argument here.  
28. J. McDowell (JP 1998), p.443-4. In point of fact, hallucinations are unlikely to share 
common impingements at the retina with veridical experiences, but McDowell‟s point is clearly 
intended to refer to inner proximate neural causes of experiences.  
29. As J. Levine has argued (2001).  
30. (1956), section 62.  
31. W. Sellars (1975), sec 50 and 51, p.308  
32. W. Sellars (1977) sections III and IV.  
33. W. Sellars (1982), Lec. I, sec. 88, p.20.  
34. W. Sellars (1982), Lec. I p.3.  
35. W. Sellars (1982) sections 43 and 44, p.11.  
36. Cf. L. Wittgenstein (1953), Part I, 151-154, and W. Sellars (1963a).  
37. The essential contrast between sensory states and concepts, and dispositional nature of 
latter, is emphasised by J Bennett in his illuminating discussion of Kant‟s conception of 
experience (1974), chapter 2.  
38. Note especially Sellars‟ criticisms around section 26 of his (1956).  
39. deVries and Triplett, (2000), p.38.  
40. It is important to realise that this problem is not circumvented by the adoption of a Direct 
Realist approach. For example, even if a total perceptual experience of red has as a 
constituent the objective property of physical redness belonging to the public object seen (or 
an instance of redness), a property that is equally open to view by all normal observers, this 
does not explain how the perceiver comes by the concept of the relevant nonconceptual 
sensory state that occurs as a component of the experience. For as we have argued, such 
sensory states do not, in themselves, involve concepts. So the Direct Realist is still stuck with 
the same problem of abstraction, of explaining how the subject moves from having a 
nonconceptual sensory state of redness to a conceptual grasp of what is experienced.  
41. In his recent book D. Smith discusses some of the various phenomenological aspects of 
experience that are, it might be claimed, distinct from the sensory level: (2002) Chapter 5 
passim.  
42. There may be some kind of similarity with vividly imagining a red shape, but that is quite a 
different issue; what is visualised in the imagination is not essential to my thought.  
43. McDowell (1998), p.442, and p.451. McDowell's account of perceptual experience is not 
reductionist in the way that Armstrong's belief analysis of perception is. Nevertheless, we are 
still owed an account of the precise way in which the intentional state of seeming to see that p 
differs from merely thinking that p.   
44. Sellars is not of course alone in emphasising the importance of training – the idea plays 
an key role in L. Wittgenstein (1953).  
45. P. Strawson (1979), part I.  
46. Alan Millar defends an equivalent claim in Chapter 1 of his (1991).  
47. This entails that the representational content of the experience is of two kinds: sensory 
states represent the situations that typically cause them; the concepts involved in experience 
represent, in a different way, those aspects of the scene that my thoughts are intentionally 
directed at. This raises interesting issues about the complexity of perceptual content that I 
plan to pursue in a further paper.  
48. F. Dretske has argued a similar position over many years: see for two example, (1969), ch 
2, and more recently, (1993).  
49. It is important to notice here that this point is independent of the debate between „theory 
theory‟ and „simulation theory‟. For even the advocate of simulation theory has to provide an 
account of how we understand the framework of mental states that we apply in our own case.  
50. As deVries and Triplett observe, Sellars‟ account of sensory states is not straightforwardly 
functionalist in the way that his account of thoughts is: see their (2000) p.169.  
51. Simon, D. and Chabris, C. (1999).  
52. There is extensive discussion of a number of different experiments demonstrating 
Inattentional Blindness in A. Mack and I. Rock (1998)   
53. A. Clark (2002).  
54. A. Mack and I. Rock (1998), chapter 8.  
55. See, for example, A. Mack (2002), R. Rensink (2000a) and J. Wolfe (1997).  
56. Rensink (2000a) p.22; see also his (2000b).  
57. Rensink (2000a) p. 22  
58. A. Clark (2002) p.188.  
59. Thanks are due to Steve Torrance and John Rose for many valuable discussions on the 
issues raised in this paper, and especially to Bill de Vries, who also provided helpful 
comments on an earlier draft.  
_______________________________________________________________   
 
